UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

12-4-2009

State v. Stewart Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 36116

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Stewart Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 36116" (2009). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 908.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/908

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

NO. 36116

1

i

v.
CLIFFORD STEWART,

REPLY BRIEF

(+a/z::>,,
:. r,,,5)
,; r

; ,:::+-i

.i .,,,,,',/

Defendant-Appellant.

)

,.>

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CASSIA

HONORABLE MICHAEL R. CRABTREE
District Judge
MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843
SARA B. THOMAS
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. # 5867

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ldaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

SARAH E. TOMPKINS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. # 7901
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ldaho 83703
(208) 334-2712
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE................................................................................
I
Nature of the Case

I

Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings...............................................................................
I
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL .......................................................................
2
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................

3

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Stewart's Motion To
Dismiss The Felony Stalking Charge At Issue In This Case ............................
3
A. Introduction............................................................................................

3

B. The Record In This Case Clearly Demonstrates That The State
Was Relying On The Prior Course Of Conduct Underlying
Mr. Stewart's Previous Misdemeanor Stalking Conviction Along
With A Single New Act ............................................................................

3

C. Prosecuting Mr. Stewart A Second Time For The Course
Of Conduct That Formed The Basis Of His Prior Stalking
Conviction Violates The Fifth Amendment Prohibition Against
Prosecuting A Defendant A Second Time For An Offense For
Which The Defendant Has Already Been Sentenced .................................7
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................
II
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ...............................................................................
12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Brown v. Ohio. 432 U.S. 161 (1977) .................................................................

6

Eichelberger v. State. 949 So.2d 358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App . 2007) ...........................
6
lannelli v. U.S., 420 U.S. 770 (1975

.....................
8

Malik v. McGinnis. 293 F.3d 559 (2nd Cir . 2002) ...............................................

7

7
Ruteledge v. U.S., 517 U.S. 292 (1996) ................................................................
State v. Chrisfensen. 131 Idaho 143, 953 P.2d 583 (1998) ................................ 5
Stafe v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 376 n.1. 859 P.2d 972 (Ct. App . 1993)..............
4
10
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259. 923 P.2d 966 (1996) .........................................

.
............................................
7
U.S. v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992) ....................
Statutes
I.C. tj 18-7905 ........................................................................................

7 10. 11

I.C. tj 18-7905(1)...................................................................................................
9
I.C. tj 18-7905(2).................................................................................................
10
Other Authorities
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (visited November 28. 2009)
http://w.merriam-webster.com/dictiona/supplemental; http://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/suppiement..................................................................
5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In response to Mr. Stewart's claims regarding the district court's violation of his
constitutional protection against being twice placed in jeopardy for the same underlying
crime, the State has presented two main lines of argument. First, the State has argued
that Mr. Stewart has not provided a sufficient record to determine whether the acts
underlying Mr. Stewart's prior misdemeanor conviction for stalking were used to support
the subsequent felony stalking charge at issue in this appeal. Second, the State relies
primarily on the U.S. Supreme Court decision of Garrett v.

u.s.' to assert that there was

no double jeopardy violation in this case.
This Reply Brief is necessary to clarify that the State's contentions are erroneous
on both points.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinqs
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously
articulated in Mr. Stewart's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

Garretf v. US., 471 U.S. 773 (1985).

1

ISSUE
Did the district err when it denied Mr. Stewart's motion to dismiss the felony stalking
charge?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Stewart's Motion To Dismiss The Felony
Stalkinq Charge At Issue In This Case
A.

introduction
The record contained in the record in this case shows that the State sought to

rely on the prior course of conduct for which Mr. Stewart had previously been
sentenced, coupled with only one new act, in support of its charge of felony stalking.
This evidence came, as it necessarily must, from the materials submitted by the State in
support of this charge and the evidence was clearly a part of the district court's record.
While the State attempts to rely on the opinion in Garrett v. U.S., subsequent
case law from the United States Supreme Court reveals that this reliance is misplaced.
Under a proper application of pertinent case law

-

and particularly in light of the

persuasive precedent from other jurisdictions dealing with identical charges to the one
at issue in this appeal - it is clear that Mr. Stewart's Fifth Amendment constitutional
protection against being punished twice for the same offense was violated. As such,
the district court erred when it denied Mr. Stewart's motion to dismiss the felony offense
in this case.
B.

The Record In This Case Clearlv Demonstrates That The State Was Relvinq On
The Prior Course Of Conduct Underlvinq Mr. Stewart's Previous Misdemeanor
Stalking Conviction Alonq With A Sinqle New Act
On appeal, the State has claimed that Mr. Stewart failed to provide evidence that

demonstrates that the course of conduct underlying his prior conviction was used as the
basis for the felony stalking charge at issue in this appeal. There are four reasons set

forth by the State in support of this contention. However, a review of each of these
reasons reveals them to be unavailing.
First, the State has asserted that this Court cannot rely on the materials
contained within the district court's own case file because defense counsel did not
specifically request that the court consider its own records, which included the State's
discovery response and supplements to the original discovery response. (Respondent's
Brief, p.6.) In doing so, the State attempts to rely on a footnote contained in State v.
MitcheN, 124 ldaho 374, 376 n.l,859 P.2d 972, 974 (Ct. App. 1993).
The Mitchell court never held that materials contained in the district court's own
record, and that have been specifically incorporated into the record on appeal, cannot
be considered by an appellate tribunal. Nor could such an assertion be maintained. To
the contrary, the evidence at issue in the pertinent portion of Mitchell was evidence that
was never made a part of the record below. Mitchell, 124 ldaho at 376 n.l, 859 P.2d at
974. In fact, the State omitted from its quotation of this portion of the Mitchell Opinion
the following sentence which demonstrates that the State's assertion lacks merit: "We
are limited to review of the record made below."

Id. (emphasis added.) (See

Respondent's Brief, p.6.) The documentation regarding the acts that the State was
seeking to rely on in support of the felony stalking charge in this case were indisputably
made part of the record below - as evinced by the fact that each of these documents
relied on by Mr. Stewart were part of the district court's own file in this case.
Second, the State has claimed that, because one of the State's discovery
responses was labeled "supplemental," there was a potential for other evidence of other
acts to have been presented by the State in support of the felony stalking charge. This

argument ignores what it is that the State's supplemental discovery response was
intended to supplement. "Supplemental" means "serving to supplement," which - in
turn - refers to the act of adding to something else. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary
(visited November 28, 2009) http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictiona~supplemental;
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/supplement.

Here, the

supplemental

discovery response merely provided information on the underlying charge that was
additional to the information previously provided to Mr. Stewart and the district court
regarding the basis for the charges in this case. And the key fact for this Court is that all
of the information provided by the State as to the basis for Mr. Stewart's charges
indicated that it was the prior course of conduct for which he had already been
sentenced, plus one additional and isolated act, that formed the factual predicate for the
felony stalking charge. (R., pp.57-59, 81-82, 88-90.) The assertion that the State
potentially could have identified other information or acts in support of the charges in
this case is nothing more than mere speculation, and this Court should not indulge in
speculation that is unsupported by the record. See, e.g., State v. Christensen, 131
Idaho 143, 147, 953 P.2d 583, 587 (1998) (declining to speculate on factual matters not
contained within the record).
The third claim raised by the State regarding the underlying factual basis of the
stalking charge in this case is one that has been expressly disavowed in pertinent case
law - that it was possible for the State to have segregated some of the acts from the
prior course of conduct underlying Mr. Stewart's previous misdemeanor conviction so as
to reserve those acts for use in support of a later conviction. (Respondent's Brief, p.7.)
This suggestion has been expressly considered and rejected by the United States

Supreme Court in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977). (See also Appellant's
Brief, pp.13-14.) In addition, case law from other jurisdictions that specifically address
double jeopardy concerns with regard to stalking charges also reject such a post-hoc
parsing out of acts from an otherwise continuous prior course of conduct in order to
seek to re-charge a defendant based upon those acts. See Eichelberger v. State, 949
So.2d 358, 359-360 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007),
Finally, the State's fourth point of contention is merely a recitation that some of
the materials submitted by the State referred to the sending of "emails" by Mr. Stewart
to the alleged victim. (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) The use of a plural term is irrelevant,
however, when the actual evidence that the State intended to rely on indicates that
there was only one new act that occurred aside from the prior course of conduct. But,
more important for this Court, the prosecutor who brought the charges in this case and who was therefore presumably familiar with the basis for those charges -conceded
that the State was seeking to charge Mr. Stewart for a single act coupled with the prior
course of conduct for which he had already been sentenced at the first hearing on
Mr. Stewart's motion to dismiss the State's charges.* (Tr., p.3; R., pp.54-55, 94-95.)
The prosecutor conceded the following:
There is only the one act on the -- on this felony. I mean, we're saying
that if you -- that this means if you've been convicted of stalking and you
do it again, it's a felony. And they're saying that when you do it again,
you've got to do it at least a couple of times to get a course of conduct.
We're saying that the course of conduct can go back to the prior action.
So I think we do need a ruling on the statute itself as to what that means.
While a different prosecutor presented argument at the second hearing on
Mr. Stewart's motion to dismiss the State's stalking charge, this Court may wish to note
that this prosecutor, by his own admission, was not familiar with the underlying basis of
the charge. (Tr., p.37, Ls.?-2.)

(Tr., p.16, Ls.3-11.)
There is no meaningful dispute in this case that the State was seeking to rely on
the prior course of conduct for which Mr. Stewart had previously been sentenced in
order to establish a course of conduct as is required to support a conviction for felony
stalking. The State's arguments to the contrary are erroneous.
C.

Prosecuting Mr. Stewart A Second Time For The Course Of Conduct That
Formed The Basis Of His Prior Stalkinq Conviction Violates The Fifth
Amendment Prohibition Aqainst Prosecuting A Defendant A Second Time For An
Offense For Which The Defendant Has Already Been Sentenced
The State's primary argument as to why double jeopardy does not present a bar

to Mr. Stewart's conviction in this case is made in reliance upon a single case:
Garrett V.

u.s.~(Respondent's

Brief, pp.11-16.) However, the holding in Garrett is

inapposite to the situation present in this case -where the prior course of conduct and
the current course of conduct are substantially identical in form - and the U.S. Supreme
Court has expressly clarified this fact in its subsequent opinion of Ruteledge v. U.S.,
517 U.S. 292 (1996).
The State also focuses on the provision of the felony stalking statute that limits
application of the statute to a person who "violates" the misdemeanor stalking statute in
support of its assertion that the State may rely on a past course of conduct for which the
defendant has been sentenced in order to establish a new stalking charge.
(Respondent's Brief, p.10.) This statutory language actually demonstrates the opposite.
The use of the present tense with regard to a violation of the misdemeanor stalking
statute - that the defendant "violates" the terms of this statute - implies that the course
of conduct regarding the acts of stalking be part of a present course of conduct. See
I.C. !j 18-7905. Had the legislature wished to permit a past course of conduct to suffice,
the legislature could have easily promulgated the statute so as to read, "violates or has
violated, section 18-7906, Idaho Code." See U.S. v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992)
(legislature's use of either past or present verb tense "is significant in construing
statutes"); Malik v. McGinnis, 293 F.3d 559, 562-563 (2nd Cir. 2002) (interpreting use of
present tense in statute as meaning that the condition must exist at the time the
complaint is filed).

The charges at issue in the double jeopardy analysis in Garrett were an alleged
violation of the federal continuing criminal enterprise statute, which is essentially a
prohibition against conspiracy to commit drug offenses, and a charge regarding one of
the drug offenses that formed a portion of the criminal drug enterprise or conspiracy.
Garrett, 471 U.S. at 775-776. While Garrett found that there was no double jeopardy
violation in bringing both charges, this holding is merely an elaboration of the longstanding rule that it does not violate double jeopardy to charge a defendant both with
conspiracy to commit an offense and the completed offense itself. See, e.g., lannelli v.
U.S., 420 U.S. 770-777-778 (1975). A different result obtains, however, when the two
charged offenses are based upon the same basic type of underlying offense.
Ten years after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Garrett, the Court turned to the
issue of whether double jeopardy would bar a prosecution for both conspiracy to
distribute controlled substances and for continuing criminal enterprise. See Ruteledge,
517 U.S. at 294.

It is also worth noting that the Court in Ruteledge applied the

Blockburger test in reaching its determination that the multiple charges in that case
violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Id. at 297-298. The
Ruteledge Court further noted that, "For over half a century we have determined
whether a defendant has been punished twice for the same offense by applying the rule
~ at 297 (internal citation omitted.)
set forth in Blockburger v. United ~ t a t e s . "Id.

To the extent that the State argues in this appeal that the Blockburger test is not the
appropriate test for determining whether two offenses are the same for double jeopardy
purposes, this assertion appears to be disavowed by the Ruteledge opinion, and by the
numerous decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court and Idaho appellate courts that
consistently apply the Blockburger test. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.14-15; Appellant's
Brief, pp.?6-17.)

This time, based upon the similarity of the actus reus of the charges themselves,
and the overlap of the underlying acts charged, the Court found that prosecutions for
both offenses would violate double jeopardy. Id. at 297-300. In so doing, the Court
clarified why the Garrett opinion was not contrary to this conclusion. Id. at 300 n.12.
The Ruteledge Court stated:
[The Garrett] holding, however, merely adhered to our understanding that
legislatures have traditionally perceived a qualitative difference between
conspiracy-like crimes and the substantive offenses on which they are
predicated. No such difference is present here. In contrast to the crimes
involved in Garrett, this case involves two conspiracy-like offenses
directed at largely identical conduct.
Id. (internal citations omitted).

The same can be said in this case

-

both Mr. Stewart's prior charge and

sentence for misdemeanor stalking and his current charge of felony stalking deal with
charges of an identical type and are offenses that are directed at largely identical
conduct. Indeed, under Idaho's statutory scheme, the commission of felony stalking is
nothing more than the commission of misdemeanor stalking with one or more
aggravating circumstances present. I.C. § 18-7905(1). Based upon the U.S. Supreme
Court's own interpretation of the scope and purview of Garrett, the Garrett opinion
simply does not apply in the context of this case.
Moreover, the decision in Garrett was largely predicated on the presence of
express, unambiguous, and unequivocal language from the legislative history (including
excerpts from the actual debates on the House and Senate floor regarding this
legislation) that made it "indisputable" that Congress intended to create separate and
independent offenses with regard to continuing criminal enterprise and the underlying
offenses committed in the course of the conspiracy involved in the drug enterprise.

Garrett, 471 U.S. at 779-784. We have no such clear directive from the legislature in
this case.
While the State has attached various documents regarding the legislative history
of I.C.

3

18-7905, the State makes no specific argument as to how this history shows

indisputably that the legislature did not intend to require a separate course of conduct in
support of a subsequent charge of stalking. (Respondent's Brief, p.11 n.3.) Instead,
the State rests on a conclusory statement, contained in a footnote, that the legislative
history supports its position. See State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966,
970 (1996) (party waives an issue on appeal if either argument or authority is lacking).
A review of the legislative history appended, but not analyzed, by the State

shows that there is no such intent expressed at any point. The discussion regarding
I.C. 3 18-7905 focuses exclusively on the desirability of creating two different degrees of
punishments for different types of stalking offenses

-

this discussion in no way

subsumes any statement of purpose regarding the permissibility of successive
prosecutions for the same course of conduct. (Respondent's Brief, Appendices A, B, C,
D.)

The State's assertion is also in contravention of the plain language of I.C. 3 187905 itself. The felony stalking statute unequivocally states that "course of conduct" for
a new count of felony stalking is defined in the same manner as that term is defined for
a misdemeanor offense. I.C.

3

18-7905(2). Had the legislature intended to require

merely one new contact or act, coupled with a prior course of conduct, the legislature
could have easily decided to adopt a different definition for the phrase "course of
conduct" that would expressly embrace acts for which the defendant had previously

been sentenced. In the alternative, the legislature could have simply defined felony
stalking as the prior commission of a stalking offense against the same victim coupled
with the aggravating factors enumerated in the statute. The legislature determined not
to do so.
The State's reliance on Garrett v. U.S. is unavailing based upon the nature of the
charges in this case and the lack of any discernible evidence from the legislative history
j 18-7905 in support of the State's position. Under a proper application of
for I.C. C

double jeopardy principles, Mr. Stewart was unconstitutionally subjected to a successive
prosecution for conduct for which he had already been sentenced. As such, the district
court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Stewart's motion to dismiss the felony
stalking charge in this case.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Stewart respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
denying his motion to dismiss his first degree stalking charge, and remand this case for
further proceedings.
DATED this 4'h day of December, 2009.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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